NWO

Wow, haven't posted in 2 weeks! School's been kicking my ass. As evidence, here's another paper I did for school. I especially like how I structured it. Also, I like how I create a whole new world order! :D

Are states a force for good? Do they stand in the way of the moral goals of humanity, and if so, what alternative do we have? And what compromises must we make between the existing international structure and this alternative? Here, I will propose that states do obstruct larger, moral interests, and that the only alternative, however difficult to realize, is the dissolution of the state as a concept. I will also put forward that the only compromise possible between the two systems is one in which the existing states ignore each other’s sovereignty to the point that they render themselves meaningless. In other words, it is no compromise at all.

Before we start the discussion of a world without states and its implications, we must establish why the state-based system is failing its people. It is not the concept of an individual state that limits the rights and abilities of its people, but the willingness of other states to allow their conception of a state’s sovereignty to prohibit them from intervening in situations which might otherwise call for action. To (over)use Peter Singer’s illustration of 1972, if you are passing by a pond and see a drowning child, you have an obligation to save it, as long as you would not lose something of equal moral value (e.g., your life). Even if you are wearing a very expensive suit which will be destroyed by the scummy pond water, Singer argues that you have, in effect, no choice in the matter: it is obligatory (Hoffman and Graham 475). To illustrate how this analogy relates to my argument against the state, put the pond and drowning child behind a fence or other property line, with the proprietor simply watching the child struggle. If this person is perfectly capable of saving the child (perhaps even having pushed him in), then we have an analogy of a government (or other force) willingly harming its citizenry. If the owner is unable to help, then the analogy is one of a humanitarian crisis. Either way, I would argue that even though you are not being asked to help (or perhaps even told not to) by the proprietor, there is still a moral obligation to save the child. To bring the analogy back to reality, it is not the existence of the fence that causes the child to be harmed, but the passerby’s willingness to let the fence bar him from saving the child.

Once we get into the real logistics of “crossing the fence,” problems abound. Martha Nussbaum raises this issue when she speaks of the detriment to a free, democratic state if there is a forcible intervention from another. She says that “such interventions may destabilize the world” or lead to tyranny by “more powerful states,” and she certainly has a valid argument (Nussbaum 257). What if crossing the fence creates more chaos and harm than one drowned child: is it still worth it? Would a policy of intervention by a strong power lead to its tyrannical hold on the rest of the world’s states, bending them to its moral view? These questions are important, but they avoid the real issue: the state that allows its citizens to come to harm is only as at fault as the system that supports that state’s right to do so. If there was no fence, there would be no problem in going to the child.

So much of Nussbaum’s work in Frontiers of Justice is focused on the idea of the individual human being as an end in itself, but she allows concerns of logistics and practicality to impede her theory, without ever giving it a chance to really flourish on its own. Nussbaum herself asks this question in the same section: “What is the rationale for this deference to the state, if one believes that one can justify certain moral principles as binding on all?” and she answers only with “prudential reasons” (ibid). This is not a fault, but it does not allow us to really see the world to which her theory takes us.

In Frontiers of Justice, there are two Martha Nussbaums: the one that supports her theory and allows it to apply to the modern world, and the one who allows prudential reasons to limit that theory. In a critique of John Rawls’ justification for not intervening in an economically dire situation in a sovereign state, she allows herself to embrace her theory to point out Rawls’ inconsistency, while setting the stage for committing that same inconsistency later. In Rawls’ Law of Peoples, he argues that if a state has the basic structure in place to right its own wrongs, then it should be left to its own devices. Nussbaum argues that Rawls would never support that same line of logic when dealing domestically with a poor family, rather than a poor nation (Nussbaum 240). But Nussbaum later makes the same argument when she speaks of prudential reasons for not interfering. She argues that we should not interfere if a nation is “above a certain threshold in terms of democratic legitimacy,” unless the injustice being committed is of a significant enough nature as to outweigh this requirement (Nussbaum 258). Her reasons are a little different, but they come from the same place. Rawls and Nussbaum both seem afraid to let the idea of the individual as a moral end take its full course, seemingly because it will inevitably lead us to a conception of the world in which national sovereignty is obsolete.

The concept of national sovereignty is only a few hundred years old, and has outlived its usefulness. In today’s modern world, states are not the only international actors and they are even more interconnected than ever before. Nussbaum remarks that Hugo Grotius, in the seventeenth century, had commented on the interdependence of nations, reasoning that there are times when it is appropriate to interfere in “the internal affairs of nations” (Nussbaum 19). Given how greatly international politics have changed in the past 350 years, it is reasonable to assume that our views on the sovereign state system should also change. Only in a world in which we are not hiding behind arbitrary borders, flags, and uniforms can we actually bring a measure of moral equality to everyone.

I suffer no illusions that a change to such a system would be anything less than globally catastrophic, but I believe that the decision-making process should be different. We should absolutely consider the implications of our theories, but (forgive the stolen terminology) it should occur at a second stage. In the first, as Rawls would undoubtedly approve, we should establish certain moral assumptions, and see where they take us logically. Then, after having designed a theoretical system of how things should be, we then consider how much of the theory is possible (or even plausible). By not allowing the theory to really flourish, we deprive ourselves of the process of developing it, from which more implications and discussions may spring.

To that end, the idea of the individual as a moral end leads us to a radically different place than a support of the sovereign state system. Nussbaum quotes Hobbes and Locke as saying that humans in the State of Nature are all essentially equal in “basic powers, capacities, and needs” (Nussbaum 30), and that is certainly true. All else being equal, so are humans in large part equal to each other. But it would be hard to argue that all humans are in large part equal today. Physically and mentally, we are certainly capable of being equal, but our political situations keep us from exercising our full capabilities. In this respect, leaving the State of Nature has made us less equal than if we had remained in it. Surely this requires remedy. I am not proposing an anarchic return to the State of Nature, but a return to that sort of equality where a person is only limited by their desires and drive. Our current political structure is what is limiting human equality, and if the state is the part of that structure that is the problem, then it stands to reason that it must change or be eliminated. Nussbaum proposes changing the system while maintaining the sovereign state system, and so I will address the possibility of a world without states.

That’s not quite accurate, though. There can’t be a world completely without states: anarchy may be attractive on paper, but in reality requires each individual to possess a level of benevolence that is more than unrealistic. So a world with one state is a more accurate term. What would this state look like and how would it act? Would regions have a high degree of autonomy as in the current structure of the European Union, or would they be ultimately at the mercy of a centralized government, as in the “states” of the United States? How would the multitude of peoples and cultures be safely protected, while still maintaining a common conception of the good?

I do not pretend to be a nation-builder, but one can imagine how such a system might work. If Nussbaum were to design this society, it would simply be a very large Well-Ordered Society (to steal Rawls’ label) encompassing all citizens of the world. Her arguments on nationality would become obsolete, and in the most idyllic view, so would war, famine, etc. It is not a difficult task to imagine a perfect world, where all people are governed as equals – as ends. What becomes difficult is what to do with those peoples who do not wish to join the super-state; there are several options, but first we must consider their reasons for not wanting to join.

First, we must assume that we have already explained the reasoning behind the society and its creation, as that would be the inevitable first step. Assuming that these people understand, but simply disagree with the system, or an aspect of it, should they be given the option of not being a part of the society? If they are forced to join (and the society accepts this), then we have essentially formed a repressive democracy – clearly, an undesirable moral result. Another option would be to allow them to be in the society, but with a separate legal status, “opting out” of those aspects of the culture to which they object. But this would lead us to a fractured society, as any other reasonable group would also find such a unique arrangement desirable. Thirdly, they could be allowed to form their own society according to their rules (although there may be cause for some consultation with the larger society), but this would lead to a serious problems. It would again be opening the door for other groups to follow suit, essentially recreating the sovereign state system. The only feasible option then is to choose a variant of the second option, with a multitude of regions, each with its own particular set of capabilities beyond a basic required set for the society as a whole. Each region would then need some degree of autonomy, yet still be answerable to the world society. There would need to be a delicate balance between allowing self-determination and preventing the existence of intra-regional policies that would cause the super-state to intervene heavy-handedly.

The problem is how to sustain such a nebulous system in the long-term. Easily fractured and systematically diverse, such a loose conglomeration of conceptions and peoples would be unwieldy at best. It would be all too easy to assume that everyone would come to agree on the society’s principles, but even Nussbaum doesn’t believe this. While she claims her list of capabilities as “fully universal,” her first way of ensuring a pluralistic view is to “consider the list as open-ended and… subject to supplementation (and deletion)” (Nussbaum 78, parenthetical phrase in original). So we must allow for a multitude of views on what capabilities are provided to each community within the grand society, but there must also be a social minimum that applies to all. It is a difficult line to walk, and one that would need to be worked out on a case by case basis. This is where I believe Nussbaum’s theory takes us: to a one-state society, bound together by a certain understanding of rights and capabilities for all, and diversified internally to allow for variation beyond the pan-cultural minimum. I believe the description of such a society warrants further study, analysis and debate, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.

Again, I suffer no illusions as to this argument’s realism, and Nussbaum’s compromise of reasonable intervention may be adequate. What it lacks in urgency, it makes up by being comprehensive. She has allowed for many contingencies and variations of circumstance, but she is content to let injustices go on in democratic, reasonable societies, confident that the empowered populace will eventually address the problem. Considering the current injustices around the world in democratic, though perhaps not reasonable nations (e.g., the controversies surrounding minarets in Switzerland, burkhas in France, and sexual orientation rights around the democratic world), there is a difficulty. Either we must be very patient, have a very high standard for “reasonable” nations, or be willing to accept less severe violations of human rights in democracies. Any way it is handled, it is something of a hole in the theory’s construct. The topic again deserves much further consideration than can be addressed here.

Either through the super-state system or Nussbaum’s system of reasonable intervention, it is clear that the current, flawed sovereign state system must be altered. When a state either causes or allows injustices to befall its people, there is no moral argument that can reasonably deny the obligation of the rest of the world to come to their aid, regardless of the wishes of the failing state’s government. Perhaps the super-state system is unworkable (it certainly has its flaws), but we need a system that goes beyond Nussbaum’s reasonable intervention idea to fully address the moral inequalities of the various states.